Everyone who talked about Afghanistan would stud their speech with exclamation points. “Afghanistan!” we were told, “has seen remarkable! progress! in the last decade!”
They had the numbers to back it up, which they presented with all the zeal of a late night infomercial: “You name a metric, it’s gone through the roof. Children in schools? Up from 800,000 in 2002 -- 800,000, in a country of 25 million people! -- up to almost 8 million at present. And most of them are in real schools now, real schools with real teachers, and not just a “school” (emphatic air quotes), sitting under a tree with a cracked blackboard and an illiterate teacher who’s covered in flies.
“And girls! Used to be exactly zero percent girls in school. Zero. You had pockets of illegal schools here and there, some hardcore mother from a literate family would take in one or two neighborhood girls and teach them to read -- but that was under pain of death, so for most of the population it was a no go. Taliban just wouldn’t allow it. Obviously that won’t fly -- can’t have economic development if you’re overlooking the earning potential of half your citizens -- and now we’re up to 40% of the kids in schools being girls. It’s not perfect yet, plenty of room for improvement, but now compared to then? Way better.”
He was just getting warmed up. “And speaking of girls, or women rather, look at maternal mortality. Afghanistan used to be the most dangerous place on earth to have a baby. It was worse than Somalia. Consider that, for a moment -- Somalia, which has no government to speak of, much less any sort of functioning medical system, was doing a better job of keeping its child-bearing women alive than Afghanistan was. Maternal mortality -- that’s deaths per 100,000 births -- used to be 1,600. That’s sixteen per thousand, more than one out of a hundred. And the average Afghan woman gave birth to 7.6 children in the course of her lifetime, so the chance of dying in childbirth was something like one in eight. We’ve cut that number in half. Obviously there’s still work to do -- the numbers still aren’t great, but we’ve come a long way and we’re going to keep working.”
The list of accomplishments and concurrent exclamation points went on and on: infrastructure (built or rehabilitated 2,000 kilometers of road!), schools (over 560 of ‘em!), wells (3,000, mostly in rural Afghanistan!), cell phones (almost 90 percent of the population has a cell phones, thanks to U.S. seed money to cell phone companies!). And the burgeoning number of clinics (over 600!) means that access to medical care -- that is, some sort of medical professional within a one-hour walk -- has skyrocketed from nine percent to almost 60 percent, which in turn has nearly doubled life expectancy. Doubled!
“There is almost no field of human endeavor where Afghanistan, with international assistance, has not made unbelievable progress,” they told us. “All of this is why you’re going to Afghanistan. We have to maintain the gains we’ve already made and continue moving forward, so that Afghanistan…” (dramatic pause) “can never again become a safe haven for international terrorists.”
I took notes on the numbers but I didn’t need the pep talk: I was already a true believer. “The United States has an obligation to the people of Afghanistan,” I was fond of saying. “Let’s be real here: if you break it, you buy it.”
I had been vaguely obsessed with Afghanistan since I was an undergraduate. As a nineteen year old, in August of 2001 -- armed with a backpack and a limitless feeling of invincibility -- I had hatched a fool-brained plan to sneak into Afghanistan by land from neighboring Turkmenistan, not yet knowing that September 11th of that same year would spark a U.S. invasion followed by the longest war in our history. The internet, which was still somewhat nascent in 2001, said I could depart on foot from a border town in Turkmenistan and walk 45 minutes or so through no-man’s-land in the east Turkmen desert into Afghan territory; you had to carry a compass and walk in a perfectly straight line or else risk blowing off a leg on a Soviet-era landmine which, if it didn’t kill you outright would certainly leave you to bleed to death in the desert. If you survived that, you could hitchhike in and make it to Mazar-e Sharif in Northern Alliance controlled territory. The thought of landmines upped the adventure factor for me. I was set on going.
I emailed my plan to a few friends at home and got an immediate and stark all-caps response (“DO NOT GO TO AFGHANISTAN”), but I laughed them off as overly cautious. But I was ultimately thwarted by the vagaries of visa law, unable to get into Turkmenistan even with a crispy $20 bill as a bribe. I was, by extension, barred from the desert that was to be my launching pad into Afghanistan which, in retrospect, probably saved my life.
I joined the State Department in 2004, mostly because I wanted someone else to buy my plane tickets and because living overseas, like landmines, had the appeal of adventure to me. I asked to go to Afghanistan for my first overseas tours and was repeatedly denied; it took seven years of employment for the Department to finally send me. I went to Pakistan for my first tour, stamping visas in Islamabad, and then on to China to do “political analysis,” a vaguely defined job in an overstaffed embassy. “Mostly I’m there to unjam the Xerox machine,” I’d say when people asked what I was doing. Bored and restless by the end, I wanted more thrill and less bureaucracy in my next assignment, something I thought Afghanistan would offer in spades.
I decided against jobs at the Embassy because the security situation -- coupled with the proximity of our over-zealous security team -- meant trips off compound, even for official business, were rare; colleagues called the Embassy “Medium Security Prison Kabul.” I opted instead for a position on a Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, where I would be one of just four civilians embedded with the military and acting as an advisor on How To Make The Province Function Again. I wasn’t sure what that would entail and spent my time in training waiting for someone to notice my lack of expertise (or experience of any kind) in civil reconstruction, but the State Department was mostly just looking for bodies, anyone willing to go to the desert. There weren’t that many of us.
“Someone, someday, is going to scream out that the Emperor has no clothes,” I said to one of my friends.
“You’re kidding, right?” he responded. “Clothes, no clothes, it doesn’t matter -- no one cares what the cannon fodder is wearing.”
My friends had questioned why I would go to Afghanistan when there were spots in Europe available. My mother felt the same way. “Is there something wrong with Paris that I don’t know about?” she wrote.
But I was not to be deterred. “I want to be out there, you know? In the dirt, hanging out with the boys in the muck, sleeves rolled up and actually getting work done,” I told my friends. “We can fix this place.”
I was a true believer, and that was good, because the place I was heading tended to erode the enthusiasm of all but the most fervent: Farah Province, in the rocky desert of southwest Afghanistan. Farah (that’s “fur-RAH,” not “FAIR-uh”) is obscure even by Afghan standards, and the only people who routinely pass through it are smugglers, humping opium to Iran. It’s home to about a million people, almost all of whom are farmers. On paper, they grow wheat and lentil-like commodity called vech -- a variety of mung beans -- but in reality they plant opium poppies and little else. Literacy rates are in the single digits and most families survive on $50 dollars a month or less. Average temperatures stay above 100 for most of the year. Aside from a few scattered, crumbling mud-brick fortresses said to date from the 4th century, there’s nothing there but hot dust and wide open spaces, punctuated by occasional mountains -- sharp and unexpected -- that do nothing to stop the sandstorms that roll in from the desert. There is little reason to visit.
I called it the Mississippi of Afghanistan: the kind of place you’re not particularly likely to drive through, but if you do, you probably won’t stop.